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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Honorable W. F. Raborn  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Red:

As an input to our NATO planning, I am interested in further exploring the factors affecting the political/military reliability of the East European Warsaw Pact nations as allies of the U.S.S.R., with particular reference to the U.S.S.R.'s assessment of those factors. I would appreciate your requesting from the U.S.I.B. a Special National Intelligence Estimate which would discuss the reliability of the East European governments and their armed forces in the terms outlined below.


The estimate should focus on the extent to which the Soviets believe they could depend on the East European governments and armed forces in their planning for the contingency of nonnuclear conflict in Europe. The estimate should canvass the general factors influencing East European reliability from the Soviet point of view, including the responsiveness of governments to Soviet direction; the loyalty of military personnel; the efficiency of the Warsaw Pact command structure and other means of control which the Soviets might employ; the effect of national enmities among the East European nations; and the effect, insofar as these are relevant, of possible future changes in NATO and relationships among the European countries.

In order to be useful for NATO planning, the estimate should assess East European reliability under the following three possible circumstances in which the U.S.S.R. might conceivably plan to engage the West in nonnuclear combat:

A Berlin crisis, arising either out of local issues or as a Soviet response to U.S. actions outside Europe.

A deliberate nonnuclear attack on Western Europe, either using only forces in place so as to provide minimum warning or using a 50-60 division force after a prior buildup.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED



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A conflict arising by accident, arising for example from some autobahn misunderstanding or an uprising in East Germany which was not immediately suppressed.

I request that this Special National Intelligence Estimate be completed in July.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

The attached was discussed at the Morning Meeting of 31 May 1966, at which time the DCI gave the original to D/ONE for action.

H. Knoche

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(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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